Phenomenology and Conventionalism: Essence and Idealization

Introduction. The article is devoted to the analysis of the ideas of phenomenology and conventionalism. The formation of two research paradigms, which took place during the revolution in the view of scientific knowledge, gave rise to new research programs that rethink the nature of scientific knowledge. The phenomenological analysis of the essence and the conventionalist analysis of the language of theories made it possible to clarify the meaning of the underlying concepts of scientific theories. Each of them focuses on the phenomenon of idealization and a special understanding of the structure of scientific fact, which becomes the main topic of discussion in the article.

Methodology and sources. The results of the study were based on comparative analysis of texts by E. Husserl (“Philosophy as a rigorous science”, “Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy”), physicist A. Poincare (“On the value of science”), and the works of Russian philosophers, representative of postpositivism and researchers in the field of conventionalism: S.N. Koskov and S.A. Lebedev. The article uses an analytical method to clarify and compare the main provisions and concepts of Poincare's concept of “scientific fact” and the essence obtained during the idealization of E. Husserl, which made it possible to define the convention as a means of idealization and to fix its place in science.

Results and discussion. A comparison of the two methodological paradigms of scientific knowledge has shown similarities and differences in their understanding of experience and in their view of scientific knowledge. A scientific convention becomes not just a definition of the meaning and significance of a linguistic expression, but a means of idealizing and fixing a certain level of scientific knowledge and knowledge of scientific fact. Thus, phenomenology and conventionalism represent the leading trends of twentieth-century philosophical thought, which reflect the main scientific changes of that time.

Conclusion. The phenomenological solution to the problem of cognition differs from the conventionalist one. However, they find common points of intersection in the issues of idealization and manifestation of scientific fact, which necessarily creates the need for further study of these paradigms of scientific knowledge. The necessary continuation of research in this area is due to the interpenetration and synthesis of the two research programs.

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