The Problem of Criteria for Statements about Fiction

Introduction. This article examines a problem in the field of analytical philosophy of fiction. The author identifies criteria for specifying statements about fiction. The aim of the article is to demonstrate a number of problems in realistic theories of fictional characters related to the replacement, ignoring, and narrow interpretation of fiction.

Methodology and sources. To achieve the goal of the study, the author uses the method of conceptual analysis. The article analyzes the most influential theories of the ontological status of fictional characters: Neo-Meinongian theories, David Lewis' fictional possibilism, Peter van Inwagen's abstract realism, Amy Thomasson's abstract artifactualism, and Kendall Walton's theory of pretense.

Results and discussion. Fictional possibilism brings the concept of fiction closer to the concept of possibility, which has counterintuitive consequences. Neo-Meinongian theories do not set specific criteria for fiction; for them, statements about fiction and statements about reality equally claim to express literal truth. This creates a problem for the analysis of real objects mentioned in fiction. It is unclear what properties should be attributed to these objects – real or fictional. Abstract realism and abstract artifactualism divide statements about fiction into fictional and metafictional. The former characterize the properties of objects in fiction, the latter – their properties in reality. This creates a problem of analyzing mixed statements in which both types of properties are attributed to an object at the same time. It is demonstrated that the most adequate concept of fiction is used by anti-realistic theories, which define fiction through participation in pretense.

Conclusion. The author raises the question of the criteria for statements about fiction and identifies a fundamental problem for realistic theories of fictional characters: the interpretation of fiction in them is replaced, ignored, or overly narrow. This does not allow for a uniform analysis of statements about fiction based on these theories. The author suggests using broader interpretations of fiction, as they avoid the problems mentioned and have greater explanatory potential.

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