Moral Agency Conditions: Moral Agent, Limited Moral Agent, Quasi-Moral Agent
https://doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2023-9-4-29-40
Abstract
Introduction. The concept of “moral agent” and its boundaries are not currently clearly defined. Given the connection between moral agency and moral responsibility, it seems necessary to introduce a clear definition of “moral agent”, as well as to differentiate the types of moral agency. The hypothesis of this article is that although the notion of a moral agent in itself is rather limited, there are a number of “borderline” groups, the definition of the status of which needs to be clarified.
Methodology and sources. The article provides an ethical and philosophical analysis of approaches to the definition of a moral agency, a comparative analysis of the concepts of a moral agent and a moral subject, as well as approaches to determining the moral statuses of various “borderline” groups in the context of the works of J. MacMurray, A. Taylor, I. Kant, M Rowlands, J. Searle and others.
Results and discussion. The article presents an analysis of the definitions of a “moral agent”, highlights the key features that make it possible to speak of a moral agency as an independent moral concept, as well as determine the conditions for the onset of moral agency. To differentiate the types of moral agents, the article introduces the concept of “limited moral agent” to denote the special status of children and the mentally ill. Evidence is provided that people belonging to these categories may have the status of a moral agent, although not to the extent that this status initially implies. As part of the definition of artificial intelligence as a “quasi-moral agent”, the key features of AI in the framework of moral communication between AI and a person are identified.
Conclusion. Based on the analysis, the article proposes a number of requirements for a moral agency. Based on these requirements, it is proposed to distinguish such types of moral agency as a limited moral agent, including children and the mentally ill, as well as a quasi-moral agent, which is an artificially created agent, including artificial intelligence.
About the Authors
S. V. GlebovaRussian Federation
Sofia V. Glebova – Can. Sci. (Philosophy, 2022), Assistant at the Department of Russian Philosophy and Culture, Saint Petersburg State University.
5 Mendeleevskaya line, St Petersburg 199034
N. V. Perova
Russian Federation
Nina V. Perova – Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Saint Petersburg State University.
5 Mendeleevskaya line, St Petersburg 199034
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Review
For citations:
Glebova S.V., Perova N.V. Moral Agency Conditions: Moral Agent, Limited Moral Agent, Quasi-Moral Agent. Discourse. 2023;9(4):29-40. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2023-9-4-29-40