On the Newen’s Person Model Theory

Introduction. Strategies for understanding another person, which play an important role in social interactions, are focused on recognizing the mental states of the person who is under consideration. These various strategies require a general theoretical conceptualization. One of attempts of this kind of conceptualization is carried out by A. Neven's person model theory. This theory is a subject of our investigation and the aim of this study is to critically analyze A. Neven's person model theory and demonstrate its advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other approaches.

Methodology and sources. A. Neven's approach is compared with three competing approaches: folk psychology theory, A. Goldman's simulation theory, and S. Gallagher's interaction theory. Conceptual analysis shows that these theories face a number of serious difficulties, which are discussed in article.

Results and discussion. Based on our analysis, we conclude that none of these three theories can be accepted as universal. At the same time, A. Newen's person model theory suggests a multiple strategy for understanding another person and seeks to incorporate the merits of other theories. Thus, the main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to consider the process of understanding another person not as a predetermined one, but as a variable dynamic process. 

Conclusion. This approach allows considering as a person not only an adult, but also a collective of people, as well as artificial intelligence, which has a great importance for the further improvement of moral practices. At the same time, the person model theory is not devoid of weaknesses; however, when overcoming them, it is able to present the most complete mechanism for understanding the personality

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