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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">discourse</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Дискурс</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Discourse</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2412-8562</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2658-7777</issn><publisher><publisher-name>СПбГЭТУ «ЛЭТИ»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32603/2412-8562-2022-8-5-42-54</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">discourse-524</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИЛОСОФИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>PHILOSOPHY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>О теории личностной модели А. Невена</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>On the Newen’s Person Model Theory</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9326-4336</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Пономарёв</surname><given-names>А. И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Ponomarev</surname><given-names>A. I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Пономарёв Андрей Игоревич – ассистент кафедры философии </p><p>ул. Профессора Попова, д. 5Ф, Санкт-Петербург, 197022</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Andrei I. Ponomarev – Assistant Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy</p><p>5F Professor Popov str., St Petersburg 197022</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">aiponomarev@etu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9071-6138</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Фролов</surname><given-names>К. Г.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Frolov</surname><given-names>K. G.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Фролов Константин Геннадьевич – кандидат философских наук (2017), научный сотрудник Международной лаборатории логики, лингвистики и формальной философии; научный сотрудник кафедры философии  </p><p>Покровский бул., д. 11, Москва, 109028</p><p>ул. Профессора Попова, д. 5Ф, СанктПетербург, 197022</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Konstantin G. Frolov – Can. Sci. (Philosophy) (2017), Research Officer at the International Laboratory for Logic, Linguistics and Formal Philosophy; Research Officer at the Department of Philosophy</p><p>11 Pokrovsky blvd., Moscow 109028</p><p>5F Professor Popov str., St Petersburg 197022</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">kgfrolov@etu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Санкт-Петербургский государственный электротехнический университет «ЛЭТИ» им. В. И. Ульянова (Ленина)</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ «Высшая школа экономики»; Санкт-Петербургский государственный электротехнический университет «ЛЭТИ» им. В. И. Ульянова (Ленина)</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Higher School of Economics; Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>26</day><month>11</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>8</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>42</fpage><lpage>54</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Пономарёв А.И., Фролов К.Г., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Пономарёв А.И., Фролов К.Г.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Ponomarev A.I., Frolov K.G.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://discourse.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/524">https://discourse.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/524</self-uri><abstract><sec><title>Введение</title><p>Введение. Стратегии понимания другой личности, играющие важную роль в социальных взаимодействиях, ориентированы на распознавание ментальных состояний, в которых пребывает личность, выступающая объектом познания. Такие стратегии, взятые в своем разнообразии, нуждаются в общей теоретической концептуализации. Одна из попыток такой концептуализации осуществляется в рамках теории личностной модели А. Невена, которая является предметом исследования в данной статье. Цель его – критический анализ теории личностной модели А. Невена и демонстрация ее преимуществ и недостатков по сравнению с иными имеющимися в литературе подходами.</p></sec><sec><title>Методология и источники</title><p>Методология и источники. Сопоставляется подход А. Невена с тремя конкурирующими подходами: теорией народной психологии, теорией симуляции А. Голдмана и теорией взаимодействия Ш. Галлахера. Концептуальный анализ показывает, что эти теории сталкиваются с рядом серьезных трудностей, которые и рассмотрены в статье. </p></sec><sec><title>Результаты и обсуждение</title><p>Результаты и обсуждение. На основании проведенного анализа сделан вывод, что ни одна из трех указанных теорий не может быть признана универсальной. В свою очередь, теория личностной модели А. Невена настаивает на множественной стратегии понимания личности и стремится включить достоинства других теорий. Как следствие, основным преимуществом данного подхода является то, что он позволяет рассматривать процесс понимания другой личности не в качестве предзаданного, а в качестве вариативного динамического процесса. Кроме того, данный подход дает возможность рассматривать в качестве личности не только отдельного взрослого человека, но и коллектив людей, а также искусственный интеллект, что имеет большое прикладное значение для дальнейшего совершенствования моральных практик. </p></sec><sec><title>Заключение</title><p>Заключение. Теория личностной модели также не лишена недостатков, однако, если их преодолеть, она способна представить наиболее полный механизм понимания личности.</p></sec></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><sec><title>Introduction</title><p>Introduction. Strategies for understanding another person, which play an important role in social interactions, are focused on recognizing the mental states of the person who is under consideration. These various strategies require a general theoretical conceptualization. One of attempts of this kind of conceptualization is carried out by A. Neven's person model theory. This theory is a subject of our investigation and the aim of this study is to critically analyze A. Neven's person model theory and demonstrate its advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other approaches.</p></sec><sec><title>Methodology and sources</title><p>Methodology and sources. A. Neven's approach is compared with three competing approaches: folk psychology theory, A. Goldman's simulation theory, and S. Gallagher's interaction theory. Conceptual analysis shows that these theories face a number of serious difficulties, which are discussed in article.</p></sec><sec><title>Results and discussion</title><p>Results and discussion. Based on our analysis, we conclude that none of these three theories can be accepted as universal. At the same time, A. Newen's person model theory suggests a multiple strategy for understanding another person and seeks to incorporate the merits of other theories. Thus, the main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to consider the process of understanding another person not as a predetermined one, but as a variable dynamic process. </p></sec><sec><title>Conclusion</title><p>Conclusion. This approach allows considering as a person not only an adult, but also a collective of people, as well as artificial intelligence, which has a great importance for the further improvement of moral practices. At the same time, the person model theory is not devoid of weaknesses; however, when overcoming them, it is able to present the most complete mechanism for understanding the personality</p></sec></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>тождество личности</kwd><kwd>теория личностной модели</kwd><kwd>теория симуляции</kwd><kwd>репрезентационализм</kwd><kwd>восприятие</kwd><kwd>философия восприятия</kwd><kwd>расширенное содержание восприятия</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>personal identity</kwd><kwd>person model theory</kwd><kwd>simulation theory</kwd><kwd>representationalism</kwd><kwd>rich-content view</kwd><kwd>perception</kwd><kwd>philosophy of perception</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">работа выполнена при финансовой поддержке гранта Президента РФ для молодых ученых – кандидатов наук (проект МК-703.2021.2 «Натуралистическая эпистемология агентности и моральной ответственности при разработке и использовании технологий дополненного интеллекта»).</funding-statement><funding-statement xml:lang="en">the work was supported by a grant of the President of the Russian Federation (project MK-703.2021.2 “Naturalistic epistemology of agency and moral responsibility in the development and use of augmented intelligence technologies”).</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gopnik A. 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