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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">discourse</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Дискурс</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Discourse</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2412-8562</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2658-7777</issn><publisher><publisher-name>СПбГЭТУ «ЛЭТИ»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32603/2412-8562-2022-8-2-5-16</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">discourse-477</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ФИЛОСОФИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>PHILOSOPHY</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Три взгляда на критику и поддержку в оценке аргументов</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Three Approaches to Criticisms and Support  in Evaluation of Arguments</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0135-4583</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Лисанюк</surname><given-names>Е. Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Lisanyuk</surname><given-names>E. N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Лисанюк Елена Николаевна – доктор философских наук (2016), доцент (2004), профессор кафедры логики</p><p>Менделеевская линия д. 5, Санкт-Петербург, 199034, Россия</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Elena N. Lisanyuk – Dr. Sci. (Philosophy) (2016), Docent (2004), Professor at the Department of Logic</p><p>5 Mendeleevskaya line, St Petersburg 199034, Russia. </p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">elisanyuk@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">Saint Petersburg State University<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>25</day><month>04</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>8</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>5</fpage><lpage>16</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Лисанюк Е.Н., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Лисанюк Е.Н.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Lisanyuk E.N.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://discourse.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/477">https://discourse.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/477</self-uri><abstract><sec><title>Введение</title><p>Введение. В статье отстаивается идея о том, что в моделировании и оценке аргументов критика и контраргументация играют более важную роль, чем защита и поддержка тезиса. Новизна этой идеи заключается в смещении главного фокуса исследования аргументации с обоснования и доказательства, с которыми ее традиционно связывают, на критику и опровержение. По сравнению с обоснованием и доказательством, критика и опровержение играют едва ли не более важную роль в контексте мягких навыков и коммуникации в практической деятельности людей, включая получение и проверку информации. Актуальность исследования продиктована тем, что аргументация – это краеугольный камень в обеих указанных сферах деятельности, значение которых на современном этапе возрастает.</p></sec><sec><title>Методология и источники</title><p>Методология и источники. В современной теории аргументации выделяют три подхода к пониманию критики, связанные с тремя подходами к пониманию аргумента: выводным, диалогическим и абстрактным. Выводной взгляд на аргумент полагается на верификацию и нацелен на обоснование заключения посредством выведения его из посылок. Диалогический взгляд видит в нем основания, предлагаемые его автором адресату, чтобы развеять сомнения последнего по поводу заключения аргумента ради убеждения или достижения согласия, и проверяет пригодность аргумента при помощи обоснования и отклонения возражения, полагаясь на принципы верификации и фальсификации. Абстрактный аргумент отвлекается от внутреннего строения умозаключения и оценивает приемлемость через фальсификацию, полагаясь на отклонение аргументов в защиту противоположного заключения.</p></sec><sec><title>Результаты и обсуждение</title><p>Результаты и обсуждение. Выводной аргумент предполагает одношаговую критику на основе его анализа и окончательную оценку со стороны его автора, диалогический подразумевает многошаговый пересмотр оценки, осуществляемой преимущественно адресатом по итогам диалога, а абстрактный аргумент сводит свою функцию к способности противостоять контраргументации, что демонстрирует его роль в защите от критики множества аргументов, к которому он принадлежит.</p></sec><sec><title>Заключение</title><p>Заключение. В диалоговом и абстрактном аргументах для обоснования и защиты тезиса возражения и критика аргументов играют более важную роль, чем определяемые с их помощью защита и поддержка, играющие ведущую роль в выводном аргументе.</p></sec></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><sec><title>Introduction</title><p>Introduction. In the article we defend a claim that criticisms and counterarguments play a more important role in modeling and evaluating arguments than defending and supporting the thesis. The novelty of this idea lies in that it shifts the main focus of the study of argumentation from the support and proof, with which it is traditionally associated, to criticism and refutation. Compared to the support and proof, criticism and refutation play more important role in the context of soft skills and communication in the practical activities, including obtaining and verifying information. The relevance of our study is dictated by the fact that argumentation is essential in both of the areas of activities, the importance of which is increasing at the present stage.</p></sec><sec><title>Methodology and sources</title><p>Methodology and sources. We identify three ways to understanding criticism with respect to three approaches to understanding of arguments, – inferential, dialogical and abstract. The inferential view relies on verification and aims to justify a conclusion by deriving it from premises. The dialogical view sees in it the grounds offered by its author to its addressee. The author aims at achieving the latter's consent to its conclusion, and the acceptability of the arguments is verified by both justifying their conclusions and rejecting objections to them. The dialogical view relies on the principles of verification and falsification. The abstract view abstracts from the internal structure of arguments and evaluates their acceptability through the falsification, conveying the rejection of arguments in defense of the opposite conclusion.</p></sec><sec><title>Results and discussion</title><p>Results and discussion. The inferential view presupposes one-step criticism based on its analysis and final assessment, the dialogical one presupposes a multi-step revision of the assessment, and the abstract view implies arguments’ ability to reject counterarguments and demonstrates its role in defending the set of arguments to which it belongs protecting many arguments from criticism to which it belongs.</p></sec><sec><title>Conclusion</title><p>Conclusion. In the dialogical and abstract approaches, objections and criticisms of arguments play a more important role in justifying and defending arguments than the defense and support defined by them, which play a leading role in the inferential approach to arguments.</p></sec></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>выводной</kwd><kwd>диалогический и абстрактный аргументы</kwd><kwd>оценка аргумента</kwd><kwd>контраргумент</kwd><kwd>пригодность аргумента</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>inferential</kwd><kwd>dialogical and abstract arguments</kwd><kwd>evaluation of arguments</kwd><kwd>counterargument</kwd><kwd>acceptability of arguments</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ивлев Ю. И. Логика: учеб. М.: Логос, 1998.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Ivlev, Yu.I. 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