The paper deals with key social determinants (sources, causes and factors) of reproduction of corruption in today's Russian society. In the study it is stated that modern Russian legislation has provided a comprehensive legal framework aimed at combating corruption; law enforcement practices have been improving, too. But, due to the lasting, permanent work of formational, domain-related and structural factors that determine both resilience and constant reproduction of conditions favourable to corruption, fighting it gives no palpable results. It is of no less importance to know how corruption is reflected in mass consciousness, how the population judges anti-corruption policies, and, last but not least, to which extend anti-corruption climate and dislike of corruption practices has been formed and spread in the society. Based on sociological data, this paper formulates recommendations for a comprehensive solution to the problem of eradicating corruption; this solution would entail both promoting democratic principles in society and politics and limiting the excessive influence of exchange relationships so powerful in the system of Russian criminal/oligarchical capitalism. It also provides a solution to activating and speeding up a systemic modernisation of the body of Russian society along the lines entrenched in the Constitution towards its evolution and transformation into a modern post-industrial society, including forming a fully functional socially-oriented democracy.

Corruption, social determinants of reproduction of corruption, formational determinants of corruption, domain-related and structural determinants of corruption, modernisation, systemic modernisation of Russian society, political and legal anti-corruption factors, democratic socially oriented rightful state, post-industrial society, perception of corruption in public consciousness

What we are witnessing in today's Russia is an intensified fight against corruption. Over the last decade, fairly tangible anti-corruption policies and judicial measures have been taken and adopted. Thus, the year 2008 saw publication and enacting of the federal law «On fighting corruption», of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation «On anti-corruption measures», and of the «National plan for corruption control» [1]–[3]; these three statutes provided organisational foundations for the policy and defined its subjects and mechanisms. The measures mentioned above, to a certain degree, have lead to a stricter control of the conduct of public servants in general. This is more pronouncedly so with regard to the higher circles of the ruling political class. After such headline-making arrests of regional officials, such as V. Gaiser (Republic of Komi), A. Khoroshavin in Sakhalin and Nikita Belykh in the Kirovsky region, now
it is the turn of the formerly 'untouchable' government ministers. Specifically, unprecedented mass media coverage and public stir were caused by the verdict rendered by the Moscow City Court in December 2017 to imprison the former Minister of Economics, Mr. A. Ulyukayev.

All this gives us grounds for optimism, rather reserved one although, about criminally or administratively prosecuting corrupt government officials and other government employees when they cannot give any plausible explanation for their property or bank accounts. It can be stated that modern Russian legislation provides a comprehensive legal framework aimed at corruption control; law enforcement practices have been improving, too. On the other hand, the well-known 20th Article of the UN Convention on corruption has not been ratified and enforced by the Russian government so far (the Art. provides for possible confiscation of the property and incomes of corrupt officials) [4]. The divergences and inconsistencies that remain in the law enforcement practices, along with a lack of systematic corruption control monitoring, have been the factors that prevented the country from making a so much needed breakthrough in this sphere. Corruption level in Russia remains very high despite all efforts. It is probably due to this fact that, according to Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index, in 2016 Russia was still at the bottom of the rating and was at the 131st place out of 176. Our country had 29 points out of 100 (the fewer points a country has, the higher its corruption level is). PRC has 79th place with 40 points.

On the other hand, if other international consulting agencies' data and findings are to be taken into account, the situation with corruption control in Russia shall be seen in a more objective way, and evaluations and judgements shall be more cautious. Thus, according to Ernst&Young monitoring data for 2017, certain improvements in corruption control policies have taken place recently. E&Y's reports showed that corruption-related risks in Russia had tangibly declined since 2011. What's interesting, by certain parameters such risks performed even better than worldwide average figures [5]. Yet, if we try to appraise the general corruption situation in the country by an array of findings and reports coming from different expertise centres, it becomes clear that Russia belongs to countries with a rather poor anti-corruption climate. Despite the fact that such ratings may well be subjective to a certain degree, they may be said to largely reflect the way international community and business perceive the situation. This status quo can be accounted for by insufficient extent of previous research on these problems and the associated social determinants of Russian corruption along the systematic sociology lines. In recent Russian and western literature, we can easily find legal and economic research on corruption and its control [6]–[10]; however, publications on its social determinants and the reproduction mechanism are obviously lacking. The main purpose of the study is to fill this gap.

The goal of the paper is to reveal social conditions, causes and factors that determine corruption in modern Russian society and the way they are reflected in the public consciousness. Sociological approach to corruption studies implies the use of questionnaire techniques, with the objective of analyzing how corruption and corruption control policies are perceived by the population. The paper is based on the data of the empirical findings from a telephone survey of St. Petersburg residents on the topic of «The problem of corruption in the mass consciousness of Russian citizens», carried out at the premises of The Centre for Sociological and WWW Surveys at Saint Petersburg State University, October 2017 (a sample of 1100 participants, subject to sex, age, city district of residence, revenue level and occupation), and from a nation-wide survey on the topic of «The efficiency of legislative measures against corruption» done by the same institution in September 2014 (a sample of 1611 respondents, in 48 constituent entities of Russia, in 120 localities; the survey took place at the place of a respondent's residence; the sample covered adult persons of the Russian Federation over 18 y/o).
Among the rather scarce literature on public surveys about corruption and corruption issues' perception in the public consciousness, we have to point to papers by M. Yu. Martynov, A. I. Gaberkorn, E. N. Kofanova, V. V. Petukhov, V. E. Tsarev and M. A. Stepanova. As a social-political phenomenon, corruption is pictured in the papers of G. A. Satarov and Yu. A. Nisnevitch [11]–[25]. Thus, G. A. Satarov in addition to measuring corruption level by monitoring-aimed sociology surveys tries to reveal and define corruption-related behaviour in Russian society and its determining factors to which he believes the so-called corruptive markets belong.

As is well known, the term 'corruption' derives from the Latin corruptio ('bribery') and designates a situation when government officials abuse their position and authority for purely personal gain. In Russian corruption is described by such terms as fief-office, extortion, acquisitiveness and venality. Currently, corruption is being considered by researchers in the context of legal, economic, politological, sociological, conflict-resolution and philosophical ethics discourses. By generalising the opinions presented within these approaches, we come to a conclusion that corruption is one of the most harmful types of deviant (criminal) behaviour manifested not only in bribe-taking and abuse of authority for personal gain, but also in the merger of some governmental/municipal officials and civil servants in general, with the business community, shadow economy and criminal organisations. In this respect, corruption is itself a kind of 'corrosion of power' entailing that authority and resources are abused – chiefly by civil servants – for personal profit. Besides, corruption, to say the least of it, appears to be a social tax sui generis, a 'toll or tribute' imposed by the corrupt bureaucracy on the society through venality, extortion or bribes demanded from ordinary citizens, businessmen, etc. Corruption essentially is the unlawful receipt of money, gifts, using one's rank or position to render 'private' services, etc. It manifests itself in such widespread forms as bribery, extortion, protectionism, unlawful lobbying in the area of loan issuance, budget allocation, distribution of resources, public contracts, along with 'palm-greasing', favouritism, ordinary clientelism and 'old-boy' protectionism, kick-back schemes, 'gifts', etc., etc. We know that in the tsarist Russia corruption began as 'fief-offices' quite legally given to functionaries instead of salary; later this practice transformed itself into unlawful venality and acquisitiveness.

If in what concerns the nature, key forms and types of corruption, along with tools and mechanisms to control this dangerous phenomenon, our colleagues have over time accumulated a substantial and trustworthy inventory, the social determinants, taken largely, of corruption and its reproduction in modern Russian society remain understudied. Taking to specialist literature, we see that Russian researchers have identified and established two theoretical frameworks to tackle the issue of social determinants of corruption; both view the role of state and business in reproduction of corruption practices differently. The first one emphasises that the state and its actions are decisive in this process. The second one stresses business as the centrepiece. In this vein, a prominent Russian researcher of corruption Georgy A. Satarov insists that the bureaucracy class, that embodies the government machinery, opposes the business community as a tightly-knit and solidified body may stand against a disorganized and only fledgling social grouping that is naturally out of competition with the former in the 'vertical' system of executive power. Due to this, patron-client relations between business and state power arise. Bureaucracy becomes a potential social actor in the market and is interested in its development, its incomes depend on market activities and, due to this, whishing or not, bureaucracy perforce contributes to its growth and improvement. As a result, the patron-client relations between business and government were what, objectively enough, made for reproduction and spread of corruption in Russian society. Corruption is ever more strongly mutilating both the public service and
municipal authorities/agencies including civil society institutions; the latter under the burden of corruption factors cease to be the social relations regulator and give way to quasi-civil and essentially criminal horizontal-vertical bonds. The business-community, unlike bureaucracy whose 'client' it perform is, depends on its 'patrons' and is compelled to resort to bribery in order to retain their market positions and secure profits, due to which corrupt officials begin to dominate over entrepreneurs [26].

Alongside this, as was shown by a survey in St. Petersburg made by us jointly with The Centre for Sociological and WWW Surveys at Saint Petersburg State University, the absolute majority of the respondents do not believe in both public servants' and businessmen's infallibility and hold that minimum half of them are definitely corrupt. The results are presented in the table 1 (Telephone survey of St. Petersburg residents, October 2017. N = 1100).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In your view, are honest public servants in Russia many or few?</td>
<td>Yes, most of them are honest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your view, are honest businessmen in Russia many of few?</td>
<td>Not all of them but a majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nearly half of them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No, such people are a minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Practically all of them are corruptionists and extortionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can't say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that the population do not trust public authorities, law enforcers and businessmen translates (почему translates, непонятно) also into how corruption causes are perceived as a systemic phenomenon. People view petty (everyday) corruption as impelled and also as a consequence of the systemic corruption coming down the power/authority hierarchy. Among the key factors of corruption renewal and endurance, St. Petersburg residents named: ineffective, unenforceable legislation – 40.7 %, nepotism and omerta practices among corruptionists – 29.7 %, excessive bureaucratization – 27.8 %, insufficient law enforcement control of the situation – 23.6 %.

In this respect, according to some experts, the society's social framework is also conducive to corruption in a loose sense, because it is actually the space where corruption reproduces itself and works thanks to insufficient self-organisation of civil society and legal awareness of the population, to the lure of civil servants' authority and position, and to the population's apathy towards corruption's adverse effects. Alongside the said circumstances, some colleagues also identify political and legal factors of the reproduction of corruption among which there are such as: excessive interference of the state with the business, corruptionists' political protection, poor effectiveness of the judiciary, defects in anti-corruption laws, ineffectiveness of the law-enforcement, etc. The source of much concern is that the judicial system and the law-enforcers are also very corrupt. At the same time, unlike to well-known 'grass-roots' venality (small-scale bribery of medical doctors, utility services employees, road police officers, etc.), the 'high-ranking' corruption is still on the increase and annexing new segments of the social space.

Given the well-argumented presentation of these approaches that endeavour to explain the social determinants of the reproduction of corruption in post-Soviet Russia, we cannot fail to note that reliable research on the systematic sociology lines is not yet available. In our view, it is from these positions that we shall be able to identify and explain the said determinants and how the mechanism works. Systematic sociology analysis of social and political determinants of cor-
Corruption and its persistence says that its formative, domain-specific and structural prerequisites and factors are to be revealed in a phased manner.

As regards the formational prerequisites of corruption, we believe that academician G. V. Osipov is right when he writes that in this respect the leading role was taken by the Russian model of criminal-oligarchical peripheral capitalism that arose and grew in the 'wild 1990ies' [27]. This system became a fertile ground for the criminal world and corruption, both 'grass-roots' and 'high-rank'. It allows oligarchs and magnates, along with other groupings of the economically prevailing class, to make cosmic profits from legitimised exploitation of hired personnel and to use their capitals for bribing government officials and MPs, for funding election campaigns of 'the right' candidates regionally and in municipalities. And the corrupt politicians or MPs 'work off' the resources invested in them by providing magnate groups and other business-communities with preferences at allocating public purchase orders, budget funding, etc. Taken from this perspective, corruption is justly termed a 'black bureaucratic market' where corrupt officials and red tapeists arbitrarily and for their own private benefit re-allocate public and municipal resources, which can qualify as an exchange of the authority of officials having limited resources at their disposal for material remuneration from unlawful or semi-lawful recipients of such resources.

Social & economical and political & legal prerequisites and factors played a key role in the unfolding of corruption in the post-Soviet Russia. Here we talk about the raw-materials export model of quasi-market economy based on private capital that has nothing in common with the multi-sector socially-oriented modern market economy; the talk is also about the social framework of the society that has grown, over the last decades, into a patchwork of class-based antagonisms. In this framework, the poor/rich gap by the key stratification criteria has surpassed all threshold limits. At the same time, Russia has sunk to the level of third-world countries by the ratio of high, middle and low social classes and by the standard of living of the larger share of the population (the poor and disadvantaged).

The ordinary public understand this, too, and see that a gap in revenue levels is linked, to the systemic corruption. The data of a survey we carried out jointly with The Centre for Sociological and WWW Surveys at Saint Petersburg State University is represented in the fig. 1 (Telephone survey of St. Petersburg residents, October 2017. N = 1100).

**Distribution of answers to the question: «Is the price hike linked to corruption?»**

![Distribution of answers](image-url)
Despite the widespread belief that corruption growth is chiefly due to public servants' misconduct, these survey findings reflect the idea that large businesses are first and foremost corrupt and their representatives are responsible for the current state d'affairs as much as public officiary. To a large extent, it is exactly the shady business schemes with backsliding for certain preferences at the market that lead to price inflation in retail sector and poorer market competition.

What for the political&legal determinants, what hinders fight against corruption is the imperfections of the jural sphere of the Russian society where social subjects and rule-making institutions (the federal parliament and MPs, the President, the majority of regional legislatures, etc.) are handling their duties more or less effectively. That said, however, the legal regulation and control mechanism in the form of individual judicial authorities, law-enforcers, prosecutors and several other legal enforcement institutions, leaves much to be desired, to say the least.

Among the purely political factors that are conducive to the reproduction of corruption and hindering fight against it, alongside the excessive interference of the state with the for-profit sector, the political protection secured by the high-ranking officials to magnates, a very controversial role went to the so-called 'political thaw' of President Dmitry Medvedev. As we know now, it brought with it a certain disorganization of the state's work and escalation of mass protests in December 2011 and early 2012 – the one that posed the threat of massive destabilization and an increase in anomic throughout the Russian society. The situation was poising at the point of getting out of control in Spring 2012; these processes were subdued only by Vladimir Putin when he returned to his post of President in May of the same year. In this respect, it is only appropriate here to remind his words that although a change and modernisation of the country are natural and necessary but «it is not acceptable to pay for this by the destruction of the state itself» [28].

At last but not least, institutional, procedural and other components of the Russian society belong to the structural prerequisites, among which it is worth noting the powerful business groups ('the seven bankers cabal') that formed themselves in 1990ies during Yegor Gaidar's 'shock therapy' reforms and Anatoly Chybais' wide 'privatisation', the patron-client relations between the state and the business, the arisal and growth of the notorious clan authority structure, whose de-facto leader was the magnate Boris Beresovsky, all of which determined the utterly insufficient self-organization of civil society institutions, degradation of the judiciary and law-enforcement, and many other a negative effect. It also worth reminding that the well-known 'vertical hierarchy of executive power' that shaped itself under the conditions of the 'authoritarian throwback' in 2000ies played a very dubious role. On the one hand, it undoubtedly contributed very much to the restoration of governability of the country and subdual of the 'parade of sovereignties' and regional separatism, to neutralisation of separatism in Dudayev's Ichkeriya Republic in Chechnya, etc. On the other hand, the adverse 'underside' of that executive vertical was the formation of a cast of 'untouchable' officials and other functionaries integrated in it including their relatives, children ('silver-spooners'), and other privileged persons. Under these conditions, the 'high-ranking' corruption enjoyed a drastic growth, to which the leaders of the non-parliamentary opposition voiced themselves large and loud. Thus, the well-known «Anti-corruption Foundation» (FBK) established by Alexey Navalny in 2011 posted on the Internet many a headline-making reports, of which most read and viewed were the rather controversial and poorly evidenced videos like «Chaika» (about the Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika and his family) and «Don't call him Dimon» (about Dmitry (Dimon) Medvedev). In addition to this, Alexey Navalny opened a number of social network accounts under the um-
brella label «Navalny's Team» where they have been actively posting both materials from his weblog, investigative journalism reports on corruption, statements by Russian politicians calling for fight against corruption, and a constantly repeated suggestion to term Russia «the country of milking, bribing and kickbacking».

Naturally, corruption control cannot be always successful. More than often this fight against corruption is only declared as a governmental «policy» whereas in fact all it comes to individual high-profile anti-corruption cases and spectacular «crash upon» petty corruption (at lower levels). According to a national survey done by The Centre for Sociological and WWW Surveys at Saint Petersburg State University, a majority of respondents believe that corruption control policies in Russia are largely ineffective. In particular, 55.6% of the respondents said that their regional authorities simply show no interest in real combat against corruption; on the other hand many of them hold (48.8%) that if the authorities wished they would be effective in this fight. The figures are shown in the table 2 (Telephone survey of Russian citizens, September 2014. N = 1611).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reply options</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, and I keep a constant track of this process</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but I am not very interested in the developments</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have heard something but don't know much about it</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know nothing about it</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not sure</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this table it is shown that corruption control measures by the authorities are barely noticeable to the public at the systemic level and have very low credibility among population. Most worrying is the insufficiently convincing work of such jural sphere institutions as the law-enforcement, including financial crimes and corruption enforcement departments where 'rogue cops' are still abundant. This said, we talk here not only of such historically problematic regions as the North Caucasian republics but Moscow itself. Recalling the near past, the arrest of Colonel Dmitry Zakharchenko (Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate for Economic Safety and Counteracting Corruption) in September 2016 made many a headline if not a shock to all and everybody. His crimes and fabulously abundant cash reserves seized during arrest have been garnering extensive media coverage till the present day and are self-explanatory. The state of affairs in government and municipal institutions and law-enforcement agencies is further exacerbated by the fact that many officials and officers of the Interior Ministry and Investigative Committee of Russia already involved in corrupt schemes, are obliged to fight corruption due to their official duties, which makes it all look like a 'fight of bees against the honey'.

Clear evidence to the above is provided in the findings of the survey of St. Petersburg residents carried out jointly with The Centre for Sociological and WWW Surveys at Saint Petersburg State University (fig. 2) asking people what the most corrupt sectors of the society are and what they think of these. The law enforcement took the first place in this anti-rating, they are firmly linked to corruption in the opinion of 42.3% of the respondents. At the same time, the respondents believe that corruption among law enforcers is two times as much as in education (22.7%) or in the housing and utility sector (22.4%). Interestingly, two thirds of the respondents also mentioned public administration as the most corrupt sector. You can see the results of the survey in the fig. 2.

Along with the already said, a special mention in this regard should be made of social and psychological properties studies of the mass consciousness of the Russians stating that from times
immemorial this public mind has as its component, particularly so in some regions like the Caucasus, Southern Federal District, where it has become normal, the 'corruption mentality' due to which no entrepreneur is capable of either starting or preserving his business without corruption [16]. This, naturally, is not to say that nepotism, clientelism, clannishness, the rule of telephone, dark-side methods of problem resolution, etc., are the intrinsic elements of Russian political and judicial culture, as some hold. We should remember that under the Soviet rule, if compared with today, the rate of corruption in governmental, municipal and law-enforcement institutions was very low. Yes, in those times, there were no formational, domain-specific or structural prerequisites and factors favourable to for large-scale corruption. And yet, such obviously negative phenomenon as shortage of high-quality and cheap commodities and food or services played its destructive role, and very actively indeed.

At the same time, looking at the everyday practice of combating corruption shows that some regions can tell us more than one story of success, of which there is no doubt. So for example, in 2017 the Directorate for Economic Safety and Counteracting Corruption under the Chief Directorate of the Interior Ministry for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region detected and suppressed many a corruption scheme involving fraud against and extortion from public purchase tender participants. The schemes employed were simple and aimed at securing a winning bid to the 'right' bidder, at causing tender disruption, at lowballing tender prices, etc. This can be supported by crime statistics retrieved from open sources. In 2017, the most affected by corruption were such economic subjects as credit institutions and state-funded organisations, whose shares were, respectively, 19.6 and 17.6 percent. The leader among all corruption perpetrations was white-collar fraud, occasionally massive one. Most often such trickeries were associated with telecommunications organisations (31 %), financial activities (19 %), wholesale trade (11 %) and with real estate business (13.5 %). At that, the key bribe takers were executive agencies officials. More than 170 bribery cases were detected and prosecuted; the average bribe amount was at the rate of 145,000 roubles. The statistics shows that the share of grave and extremely grave offense in corruption was as much as 90 percent. The ratio of corruption offense on a large and very large scale was 29 percent. Virtually every third offence detected involved bribery and other corruption misdoings. The lion's share in detection and solution of this type of crime went to the Directorate for Economic Safety and Counteracting Corruption of the city and region, amounting to 85.3 percent of all detected corruption cases [29].

Not lessening the merits of Russian Interior Ministry officers in combating corruption, still we think it is worth noting that such law-enforcement measures alone cannot bring about the de-
sired results, without relying on a systematic approach to the problem. The findings of public surveys carried out jointly with The Centre for Sociological and WWW Surveys at Saint Petersburg State University, asking about effective corruption control measures, also speak in favour of this conclusion. Russian citizens believe that it is motivation for anti-corruption behaviour that is to be targeted by such measures in the first place. The data obtained is provided in the Table 3 (Telephone survey of St. Petersburg residents, October 2017. N = 1100).

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers to the question: «In your view, what motives do have the people who keep themselves from corruptive behaviour?» (multiple)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the law</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of criminal penalty</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation issues</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They believe that corruption is immoral</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't tell (NOT TO BE READ OUT)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moral behaviour, reputation and respect for the law are what, in people's view, constitute the body of key motives for anti-corruption behaviour. Stimulating these is to be the principal objective of state's corruption control policies and civil society initiatives. It is going to be a basis for future successful anti-corruption measures.

Figure 3 shows which measures the respondents consider effective in terms of corruption control. It is clearly seen that concerning anti-corruption measures St. Petersburg residents regard to be most effective, conventional compulsion and legislation instruments are the top-of-mind for the respondents. People's expectations of building up a systematically organised corruption control are associated first and foremost with these mechanisms. Severe measures and tough action, along with certainty of punishment, will also enhance the authority and purge the ranks of the law enforcers, as regular citizens strongly believe.

![Effective measures of corruption control](image-url)
At the same time, among other anti-corruption measures the respondents gave much weight to the activities of civil society institutions. The role of mass media and their investigative journalism initiatives is particularly important to 33.8% of the respondents. Significantly, a majority of the respondents of the survey (24.2%) noted that mass media are currently the most potent weapon against corruption. Another benefit, if viewed from the standpoint of democratic values as indispensable to Russia's development, is that a considerable share of our respondents referred to such measures as anti-corruption activities of political parties and not-for-profit organisations (19.7%), along with educational and awareness initiatives (21.8%).

Similar conclusions were received by researchers from the Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences. The respondents were asked to complete the phase: «We can effectively control corruption if we...»:

1) make our anti-corruption legislation more severe;
2) better plan and control the allocation of budget funds;
3) improve the legal literacy of our population;
4) impose a stricter property control over those individual and companies who partake in budget spending, public purchase etc.;
5) establish multiple efficiency evaluation systems of bureaucracy interaction with the population;
6) raise salaries for all government employees;
7) bind public officials' salary to the quality of services they render to people;
8) reach out to the population with the aim of strengthening their anti-corruption feelings;
9) ensure that e-tenders are carried out openly and transparently;
10) reduce the conditions favourable to corruption by means of legislation;
11) constantly detect and reveal typical schemes of law circumvention;
12) minimise contacts between civil servants and service consumers;
13) put a limit on the 'immunity' granted to various individuals when investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption;
14) create better conditions for capital inflow and stop capital flight from the country [26].

Summing up, we can say that effective control of corruption hinges essentially on promoting democratic principles in society and politics, and on limiting the overly influential exchange relationships so powerful in the system of Russian criminal-oligarchical capitalism. And this speaks in favour of activating and speeding up a systemic modernisation of the body of Russian society along the lines entrenched in the Constitution towards its evolution and transformation into a modern post-industrial society, including forming a fully functional socially-oriented democracy.

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СОЦИАЛЬНЫЕ ДЕТЕРМИНАНТЫ ВОСПРОИЗВОДСТВА КОРРУПЦИИ
В СОВРЕМЕННОМ РОССИЙСКОМ ОБЩЕСТВЕ

Освещаются ключевые социальные детерминанты (источники, причины и факторы) воспроизводства коррупции в современном российском обществе. Отмечается, что в современной России имеется основательная законодательная база для противодействия коррупции и совершенствуется правоприменительная практика. Но вследствие устойчивого существования и перманентного действия формационных, сферальных и структурных факторов, обусловливающих не только живучесть, но и постоянное воспроизводство условий для коррупции, борьба с ней не дает результатов. Не менее важно знать, как коррупция отражается в массовом сознании, какие оценки антикоррупционной политики дают сами граждане, насколько в обществе сформированы антикоррупционный климат, неприятие коррупционных практик. На основе материалов социологических исследований в статье формулируются предложения по комплексному решению проблемы искоренения коррупции, предусматривающему не только расширение демократических начал в обществе и политике, ограничение чрезмерного влияния товарно-денежных отношений, господствующих в российской системе олигархического капитализма, но прежде всего активизацию системной модернизации всего российского общества на принципах Конституции в направлении его эволюционной трансформации в современную модель постиндустриального общества, включая формирование полноценного демократического социально-правового государства.

Коррупция, социальные детерминанты воспроизводства коррупции, формационные детерминанты коррупции, сферальные и структурные детерминанты коррупции, модернизация российского общества, политико-правовые факторы противодействия коррупции, демократическое социально-правовое государство, восприятие коррупции массовым сознанием